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 THE PLURALITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS1 
William G. Lycan
My topics are consciousness.  The plural is deliberate.
Both in philosophy and in psychology, “the problem of consciousness” is 
supposed to be very special.  And the past fifteen years have seen an explosion 
of work on “it” by philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists as well. 
Besides the individual journal articles and books, there is now a vigorous 
Journal of Consciousness Studies; and John Benjamins Publishing Company’s 
book series, Advances in Consciousness Research, is flourishing and includes 
some excellent works.  
But if we look closely at some sample texts, we are struck by an astonishing 
diversity of topics that have gone under the heading of “consciousness.”  
1.  Here is one sample text.  Martin Davies and Glyn Humphreys begin the 
Introduction to their acclaimed anthology, Consciousness (1993), as follows.
Consciousness is, perhaps, the aspect of our mental lives that is the 
most perplexing, for both psychologists and philosophers.  The Mac-
millan Dictionary of Psychology contains as its entry for consciousness: 
‘the having of perceptions, thoughts, and feelings; awareness.  The 
term is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible 
without a grasp of what consciousness means’ (Sutherland, 1989, 
p. 90).  [For whatever reason, Davies and Humphreys chose not to 
quote the entry’s concluding sentence: ‘Nothing worth reading has 
been written on it.’]  On the side of philosophy, Daniel Dennett notes 
in The Oxford Companion to the Mind that consciousness ‘is both the 
most obvious and the most mysterious feature of our minds’ (Gregory, 
1987, p. 160); and Thomas Nagel famously remarks (1974, p. 166), 
‘Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less 
interesting.  With consciousness it seems hopeless.’
These remarks might suggest that consciousness—indefinable and 
mysterious—falls outside the scope of rational enquiry, defying both 
scientific and philosophical investigation.  But, in fact, the topic spans 
the history of psychology from William James until the present; and the 
past fifteen or twenty years have also seen an upsurge of philosophical 
interest in the place of consciousness in the natural order.  [p. 1]
These paragraphs assume, or seem to, that there is this one thing, con-
sciousness (that is elusive and hard to define and perhaps outside the scope of 
rational enquiry).  The authors later go on to qualify that idea, distinguishing 
some notions that are so different as to have little to do with each other.  But 
there are still many readers who would be taken in by those opening paragraphs 
if they didn’t read further.
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And in fact, the anthologized essays are a grab-bag; some of them bear no 
discernible relation to others.  The collection contains (besides philosophical 
articles on the distinct(!) topics of awareness, qualia, and subjectivity), “Theory 
and Measurement in the Study of Unconscious Processes,” “Impairments of 
Visual Awareness,” “Freud’s Cognitive Psychology of Intention: The Case of 
Dora,” and “The Intentionality of Animal Action.”  Brian Smith once said of 
computation that it “is a site, not a subject-matter”; “consciousness” is a flea 
market or jumble sale, not even a site.
2.  By way of complaining about philosophers’ habitual logic-chopping, 
distinction-mongering, verbal disputation, etc., my psychologist friend Paul 
Schulman once told me, “We don’t care what anything is called; we just wan-
na measure it.”  Damned right, too; what does it matter which problems have 
been called “consciousness”?  Philosophers should not care what the distinct 
problems are called either.  But everyone ought to care that they are distinct. 
Conflation of them is not merely a theoretical possibility.  It has occurred, over 
and over again, resulting in countless confusions and errors.  I urge us all to 
keep the distinct problems distinct.  Not only will confusion and error thereby 
be avoided; I argue that if we divide we shall conquer.
Some of the topics and issues that have gone under the heading of “con-
sciousness” are brutely empirical.  Some are more abstractly theoretical.  Some 
are outright philosophical and conceptual.  I myself see these differences as 
differences of degree only, but they are still differences.  One important dif-
ference, though far from the only one, is that of “how does” questions from 
“how possibly” questions – e.g., “How does a human subject/brain accomplish 
such-and-such a task?,” vs. “How could any theory of kind so-and-so possibly 
explain this refractory feature of human experience?” or “How could a mere 
information-processing system possibly have properties of this remarkable sort?” 
Scientists sometimes pay lip service to one notorious “how possibly” ques-
tion or another, and even voice that question in a tone of awed respect, but 
then proceed to announce that what we need is more information-processing 
models, or more neuroscience, ignoring the theoretical obstacle that drives the 
“how possibly” question, the obstacle that makes the relevant achievement 
seem impossible.2   
For example, all too often we hear it suggested that advances in neurosci-
ence will solve Thomas Nagel’s (1974) and Frank Jackson’s (1982) conceptual 
problem of “knowing what it’s like” – or even that advances in neuroscience 
have solved it.  This is grievously confused.  For Nagel’s and Jackson’s claim 
is precisely that there is an irreducible kind of phenomenal knowledge that 
cannot be revealed by science of any kind.  Nagel’s and Jackson’s respective 
“Knowledge Arguments” for this radical thesis are purely philosophical; they 
contain no premises that depend on scientific fact.  Now, either the arguments 
are unsound or they are sound.  If they are unsound, then so far as has been 
shown, there is no such irreducible knowledge, and neither science nor anything 
else is needed to produce it.  But if the arguments are sound, they show that 
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no amount of science could possibly help to produce the special phenomenal 
knowledge.  Either way, neither neuroscience nor any other science is pertinent. 
(I shall discuss Jackson’s argument below.)
And in general, no appeal to normal science is going to answer any philos-
opher’s “how possibly” question, though it might happen that some hidden 
corner of normal science would lessen the force of such a question.  
3.  Here are some of the topics and issues that have gone under the “c-” 
heading.
 •  Consciousness as opposed to unconsciousness (the “normal waking 
state”).
 • Empirical questions of accessibility, attention, and reportability.
 • The control of voluntary action.
 • The temporal anomalies (color phi, the cutaneous rabbit, etc.).
 • The Binding Problem(s).
 • The development of the self concept.
 • Some matters of intention and forming intentions.
 • Putative “consciousness” deficits:  The possession of information  
  without awareness of that information.
   — Blindsight.
   — Semantic (etc.) priming.
   — Agnosias with “covert knowledge.”
   — Neglect, ditto.
So far, these topics are all empirical, or at least toward the empirical end of 
the spectrum.  Some, like the temporal anomalies, are of more philosophical 
interest than others.3   But now here are some more abstract and theoretical ones. 
State/event consciousness:  A state of a subject, or an event occurring within 
the subject, is a conscious as opposed to an unconscious or subconscious state 
or event  iff the subject is aware of  being in the state / hosting the event.  In 
virtue of what is the subject aware of some of her/his own mental goings-on 
but unaware of others?
Introspection and introspective awareness, and privileged access to the internal 
character of one’s experience itself.  I am directly or “directly” aware of my own 
experience, or some of it, in a way that you cannot be; that needs explaining.
Qualia (strictly so called):  The monadic, first-order qualitative features of 
apparent phenomenal objects.  When you are experiencing a yellowy-orange 
after-image, what exactly is it that has the yellowy-orange color?  For that mat-
ter, when you are (veridically) seeing a ripe banana, there is a corresponding 
yellow patch in your visual field.  What ontological account is to be given of 
the yellowness of that patch (which might be as it is even if the banana were 
not real)?  Bertrand Russell took it to be obvious, in need of no argument at 
all, that the bearers of such phenomenal color properties are nonphysical in-
The Plurality of Consciousness     35
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dividuals, “sense data” as he called them; for impressive argument in addition, 
see Jackson (1977).
Homogeneity or grainlessness:  The smooth continuous character of a phenom-
enal quality such as color, as contrasting with the discrete, particulate nature of 
the material of which we are made.  The after-image is entirely yellowy-orange, 
yellowy-orange through and through, without gaps, and it has no part that is 
not yellowy-orange.  But nothing in the physical world has no part that is not 
yellowy-orange.  (Sellars, 1962, 1965, 1971.)
The intrinsic perspectivalness, point-of-view-iness, and/or first-personishness of 
experience, as discussed by Gunderson (1970), Nagel (1974) and others.  In one 
way or another, our experience of our own mental states requires the adopting of 
a very special point of view; our experience of our external environment, though 
invariably from a point of view, is not perspectival in the same, deeper way. 
Funny facts, or special phenomenal knowledge as allegedly revealed by the 
“Knowledge Arguments” mentioned above.  It seems that the facts must be 
nonphysical facts.
The ineffability of “what it’s like” (in the higher-order sense):  One often cannot 
express in words what it is like to have a particular sensation.  What is it like 
to experience the yellowy-orange of a yellowy-orange after-image?  (It’s yel-
lowy-orange, yes, I heard you the first time; but can you tell someone in intrinsic, 
not comparative, terms, what it’s like to experience visual yellowy-orange?)  
The “explanatory gap” called to our attention by Joseph Levine (1983, 1993): 
Even if God were to assure us that, say, the Type-Identity Theory of mind is 
true and that such-and-such a conscious experience is strictly identical with a 
firing of certain neural fibers, we would still lack an explanation of why those 
fiber firings feel to their subjects in the distinctive way they do.  Indeed, to 
Levine it seems “arbitrary” that they do.
4.  Psychologists and (especially) philosophers have tended to think of 
“consciousness” in the same mental breath as “phenomenal experience.”  But 
notice that phenomenal experience is necessarily involved only in the last 
six of the foregoing issues, and has nothing intrinsically to do with any of the 
others.  (I shall call the last six, qualia-strictly-so-called through the explanatory 
gap, “the problems of phenomenal experience.”)  Just those six are perhaps a 
daunting array.  
Theories “of consciousness” have been offered by cognitive psychologists 
(Mandler (1985), Baars (1988), Shallice (1988a, 1988b), Johnson-Laird (1988), 
Schacter (1989), Kosslyn and Koenig (1992)), and by neuroscientists (Edelman 
(1989, 1992); Crick and Koch (1990)).  Philosophers have put forward others: 
D.M. Armstrong’s (1968, 1981) Lockean “inner sense” theory, David Rosenthal’s 
(1993) Higher-Order Thought theory, D.C. Dennett’s (1991) Multiple Drafts 
theory.  However, the key thing to grasp about all of these is that not one of 
them even addresses any of the six problems of phenomenal experience.  I am 
not speaking pejoratively and I do not mean my previous assertion as a criti-
cism of any of the theories.   Some of their creators did not really aim them at 
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any of the six problems, even though they paid lip service as recorded above. 
Others, particularly the philosophers, did not even superficially intend them 
to address the six problems.  The theories were aimed at different phenomena 
and may be admirable explanations of those phenomena.  
I draw two morals:  First, no one should claim that problems of phenomenal 
experience have been solved by any purely cognitive or neuroscientific theory. 
(I find myself in surprising agreement with Chalmers (1996) on that.)  Second 
and perhaps more importantly, the theories cannot fairly be criticized for failing 
to illuminate problems of phenomenal experience.  And many of them have 
been so criticized, e.g., by Chalmers (1996).4  Armstrong’s and Rosenthal’s 
theories, in particular, are very explicitly theories of awareness and of privileged 
access, not theories of qualia or of subjectivity or of “what it’s like.”  (In fact, 
both Armstrong and Rosenthal offer theories of qualia, but quite different 
theories, and elsewhere (Armstrong (1968, 1999), Rosenthal (1991)).  Never 
criticize a philosophical theory for not explaining X unless the theory is either 
a theory of X or a theory of something which essentially includes X – at least 
not when its proponent quite rationally disavows concern for X.
5.  It is the problems of phenomenal experience that have most greatly 
exercised philosophers, often under the heading “the problem of phenomenal 
experience.”  (Chalmers (1996) calls “it” “the hard problem of consciousness.”) 
But even once we have split off the six from the preceding ten and more, we 
must continue to distinguish and divide.  Much harm has resulted, within 
philosophy, from conflating among the six themselves.  To make progress, we 
must take them one at a time.
For the record – well, not only for it – I will note my own positions on each 
of the six problems,5  and then conclude with a remark on why the positions 
are dialectically important.
Qualia (strictly so called):  Again, qualia in my sense are the introspectible 
qualitative phenomenal features that characteristically inhere in sensory 
experiences, such as the color of an after-image or any other patch of color 
occupying some region of your ordinary visual field right now; other examples 
are the pitch or the volume of a heard sound, and the smell of a smell.  I em-
phasize that these are phenomenal properties.  They may be part of normal, 
veridical sensory experience; or they may be hallucinatory or otherwise purely 
subjective, and correspond to nothing in the subject’s actual environment.  
In previous works I have called qualia “introspectible monadic properties 
of apparent phenomenal individuals,” meaning the characteristic properties 
of what Russell thought were actual phenomenal individuals, i.e., of what he 
called sense-data; Russell took qualia in my sense to be first-order properties 
of sense-data.  But my reference to “apparent phenomenal individuals” has 
sometimes confused readers, since it may be hard to think about “characteristic 
properties of” sense-data without falling in with the assumption that there really 
are sense-data.  Yet it is crucial to see that one need not believe in sense-data to 
believe in qualia.  Most of us reject Russell’s idea that an after-image is an actual 
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and nonphysical individual thing, but if you are experiencing a yellowy-orange 
after-image, you cannot deny that in some sense there is yellowy-orangeness 
in your visual field; yellowy-orangeness is somehow visually exemplified and 
present to you.  If the yellowy-orangeness is (indeed) not a first-order property 
of an immaterial sense-datum, then of what is it a property, and/or, what kind 
of property is it?  We must relocate it ontologically.  And I maintain (Lycan 
(1987, 1996)) that this is a very difficult metaphysical problem.
To see the difficulty, suppose that while you are experiencing the after-im-
age, there is in reality no yellowy-orange physical object in your environment. 
Suppose also that there is no yellowy-orange physical object in your brain. 
But there is a yellowy-orange something before you, Russellian sense-datum or 
not.  If there is no yellowy-orange physical object outside your head and no 
yellowy-orange physical object inside your head, it follows that the yellowy-or-
ange something is a nonphysical object.  So much for materialism; it seems 
that the yellowy-orange something might as well be a sense-datum after all.  
To carry us between the horns of the foregoing dilemma, I defend what has 
come to be called the Representational theory of the qualitative features of 
apparent phenomenal objects:  When you see a (real) ripe banana and there is 
a corresponding yellow patch in your visual field, the yellowness “of” the patch 
is, like the banana itself, a representatum, an intentional object of the experi-
ence.  The experience represents the banana and it represents the yellowness 
of the banana, and the latter yellowness is all the yellowness that is involved; 
there is no mental patch that is itself yellow.  If you were only hallucinating a 
banana, the unreal banana would still be a representatum, but now an inten-
tional inexistent; and so would be its yellowness.  The yellowness would be as 
it is even though the banana were not real.  Likewise, when you experience a 
yellowy-orange after-image, you visually represent a colored spot in real phys-
ical space, and the yellowy-orange is the represented spot’s represented color.
Here is how we evade the Russellian dilemma:  Notice that each disjunct 
assumes that the yellowy-orange “something” is an actual thing (else we could 
not derive the unwanted conclusion that there actually exists a nonphysical 
yellowy-orange thing).  The Representational theory affords a third alternative, 
by supposing that qualia are intentional contents of sensory states, properties 
of intentional objects, represented properties of representata.  Of course it is 
characteristic of intentional contents that they may or may not actually exist. 
Your visual system quite often portrays, alleges something yellowy-orange.  But, 
vision being not entirely reliable, on a given occasion the yellowy-orange thing 
may or may not actually exist.
Suppose Ludwig is seeing a real orange in good light, and it looks yel-
lowy-orange to him.  He is visually representing the actual yellowy-orange-
ness of the orange, and veridically so.  But suppose Bertie is experiencing a 
yellowy-orange after-image as a result of seeing a flash bulb go off.  According 
to the Representational theory, that is for Bertie to be visually-representing a 
filmy yellowy-orange blob located at such-and-such a spot in the room. The 
representation has a truth-condition involving yellowy-orangeness.
38   William G. Lycan
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There visually appears to Ludwig to be a yellowy-orange orange; there visually 
appears to Bertie to be a yellowy-orange blob.  Ludwig’s orange is real and so 
is its yellowy-orangeness, but Bertie’s blob is unreal, an intentional inexistent, 
and so is its yellowy-orangeness.  The yellowy-orangeness is the color of an 
illusory, nonexistent thing.   
If that seems weird to you, think of hallucinating pink rats.  Perhaps you 
know the rats are not real, but they are unquestionably pink.  The pinkness is 
the color of the nonexistent rats.  (I take that to be uncontroversial.6 )  Con-
struing intentionality as representation, we can say that the pinkness is the 
represented color of the represented but nonactual rats, i.e., it is the color they 
are represented as having.7 
Nor should it be surprising that Bertie’s blob is a nonactual, nonexistent 
thing.  Since in reality there is no yellowy-orange blob in the room with Bertie, 
his visual experience is unveridical.  Remember that after-images are illusions; it 
looks to Bertie as though there is a yellowy-orange blob before him, when there 
is not anything yellowy-orange before him.  Moreover, vision science has an 
extensively worked out explanation of this particular illusion.  It is well under-
stood why it can look to someone as though there is something yellowy-orange 
even when there is not anything yellowy-orange before that person.
I contend that Russell mistook a nonactual physical individual for an actual 
nonphysical one.
6.  Homogeneity or grainlessness:  Here I would appeal to the Representational 
theory of qualia, and point out that vision does not represent smoothly colored 
physical objects as having gaps in color.  It is a further and interesting question 
whether this is tantamount to vision’s representing the objects as having no gaps 
in color, but in any case there is a kind of illusion here too, either perceptual 
or cognitive.  We are visually unaware of gaps, and so it seems to us that there 
are no gaps.  Logically that is a scope fallacy, but it is one that in perception 
we commit regularly.  (Armstrong (1981a) calls it the “Headless Woman” 
fallacy, after the well-known stage magicians’ illusion:  The illusionist presents 
a woman on a brightly lighted stage and places a closed box over her head. 
The illusionist then opens the front of the box.  Secretly, the woman’s head 
has been covered by a black cloth, so we do not see it.  Our seeing no head 
makes it look to us as if there is none to be seen.  It appears that the woman 
now has no head.  As Armstrong says (p. 51):  “Out of sight is not simply out 
of mind.  It seems to be out of existence.”) 
7.  The intrinsic perspectivalness, point-of-view-iness, and/or first-personishness 
of experience:  I defend an “inner sense” theory of awareness and introspection 
that I swiped from Armstrong (1968, 1981b).  On this view, introspection is 
much like internal perception, and (like any mode of perception) gives you a 
unique and partial perspective on what you are perceiving.  Indeed, I hold that 
introspection is the operation of an internal scanner or monitor, that produces 
representations of your first-order mental states themselves, representations 
that are made of concepts peculiar to the monitoring device.  The blind men 
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and the elephant are representing the same thing very differently, so differently 
that they do not, perhaps cannot realize that what they are representing is the 
same as what each of the other men are representing.  Similarly, seeing an event 
and hearing the same event may be nothing alike.  And introspecting what is 
in fact a neural event is not a bit like seeing that same event as from outside 
one’s head, using mirrors.  Your introspective device deploys very distinctive 
concepts of its own.  These features of the introspector combine, I hold, to 
explain the intrinsic perspectivalness of the mental as such:  The mental as 
such is the neural, not as such, but as viewed from the unique introspective 
perspective.
If the idea of internal monitors in your brain seems fanciful and/or empirically 
unmotivated, consider the striking but neglected fact that our introspective 
attention is under voluntary control.  I can ask you to concentrate on your 
visual field as such, then to focus on a particular patch of phenomenal red, then 
to shift your attention to the upper left quadrant of the field, then to attend to 
what you feel in your left elbow, then to ask yourself what you are smelling at 
the moment, etc., and you can do those things at will, with a remarkable degree 
of facility and precision.  All that activity feels unmistakably like scanning 
and monitoring rather than just thinking.  And surely something cognitive, 
and presumably something neurophysiological, subserves it.
(For that matter, consider the following simple argument.  We distinguish 
between mental states whose subjects are aware of being in them and those 
whose subjects are not aware of being in them.  The “of” in “aware of” is the 
“of” of intentionality; what one is aware of is an intentional object of the 
awareness.  But, as is widely granted, intentionality is representation; a state 
has a thing as its intentional object only if it represents that thing.  Therefore, 
awareness of a mental state is a representation of that state; a state you are 
aware of being in is a state that is itself represented by another of  your own 
mental states.  Thus, something in you, presumably a kind of brain mechanism, 
has the capacity to represent mental states of yours.)
The “inner sense” theory of awareness and introspection is not immune to 
objection (Chapter 2 of Lycan (1996) rebuts a number of those), but here let 
me ward off one that is both pervasive and viciously misguided:  It is often 
complained that such a theory does not in any way explain the qualitative or 
phenomenal character of experience; a mere higher-order representation could 
hardly bring a phenomenal property into being.  (So how can they claim to 
be theories of consciousness?)  
If you have attended to the argument of section 4 above, you will already 
have anticipated the reply to that objection:  The “inner sense” theory makes 
no claim to have explained anything about qualia or phenomenal character. 
It is primarily a theory of the distinction between mental states one is aware 
of being in and mental states one is not aware of being in; and I have used it 
additionally to explain the intrinsic perspectivalness of the mental as such. 
But some other theory must be given of qualia or phenomenal properties.  (I 
have nominated the Representational theory for that purpose.)
40   William G. Lycan
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8.  Funny facts and special phenomenal knowledge:  Here is Jackson’s (1982) 
version of the “Knowledge Argument” mentioned in section 2 above.  He offers 
the now painfully familiar example of Mary, the brilliant color scientist trapped 
in an entirely black-and-white laboratory.  (Even she herself is painted black and 
white.  There are potential complications that would have been avoided had 
Jackson made Mary temporarily color-blind instead of merely confined to her 
lab space, but I shall ignore those.)  Working through her modem and various 
black-and-white monitors, she becomes scientifically omniscient as regards 
the physics and chemistry of color, the neurophysiology of color vision, and 
every other conceivably relevant scientific fact; we may even suppose that she 
becomes scientifically omniscient, period.  Yet when she is finally released from 
her captivity and ventures into the outside world, she sees colors themselves 
for the first time; and she thereby learns something, viz., she learns what it is 
like to see red and many of the other colors.  That is, she learns what it is like 
to experience subjective or phenomenal redness, never mind the actual colors 
of the physical objects she encounters (which, scientifically, she already knew). 
And so she has acquired information that is – by hypothesis – outside the 
whole domain of science.  It is intrinsically subjective phenomenal informa-
tion, and what she has learned seems to be an intrinsically perspectival fact, 
that eludes all of science.  According to materialist theories of mind, no fact 
about the mind is anything but a neurophysiological or otherwise scientific or 
“objective” fact; so it would follow that materialism is false.
Actually there is a crucial distinction to be respected here.  In Jackson’s 
official formulation, the word “fact” is not used; his conclusion is just that “one 
can have all the physical information without having all the information there 
is to have” (p. 472).  This, he says, refutes the doctrine he calls “Physicalism” 
(p. 469): “All (correct) information is physical information.”  But depending 
on how one construes the slippery term “information,” “Physicalism” in this 
sense need not be taken to be an ontological claim at all.  It is most naturally 
understood as being about truths, rather than about what kinds of things there 
are.  And taken in that way, it is not entailed by materialism about the mind. 
(Materialism says only that human beings are made entirely of physical matter 
and that their properties, and facts about them, consist in arrangements of that 
matter.  It hardly follows that every sentence or proposition about a human 
being means something about physical matter.)  However—witness his title, 
“Epiphenomenal Qualia”—Jackson goes on to draw an explicitly ontological 
conclusion.  
Here is a more formal statement of the Knowledge Argument, construed 
ontologically, as an objection to materialism.
    (1) Before her release, Mary knows all the scientific and other “objec-
tive”   facts there are to know about color and color vision and color 
experi-  ence, and every other relevant fact.   [Stipulation.]
     (2)  Upon being released, Mary learns something, viz., she learns what 
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it’s   like (w.i.l.) to experience visual redness.   [Seems obvious.]
∴ (3) There is a fact, the fact of w.i.l. to experience visual redness, that  
 Mary knows after her release but did not know prior to it.   [1,2]
    (4)  For any facts: if F1 = F2, then anyone who knows F1 knows 
F2.      [Suppressed; assumes simple factive grammar of “know.”]
∴ (5) There is a fact, that of w.i.l., that is distinct from every relevant   
 scientific/“objective” fact.   [1,3,4]
    (6)   If materialism is true, then every fact about color experience 
is    identical with some physiological, functional, or 
otherwise scientific/  “objective” fact.
_______________________________________________________
∴ (7)  Materialism is not true.   [5,6]
(4) is supplied because without (4), there seems no way to get (5) from (1) 
and (3).
I reject (4).  (4) may at first seem obvious, because it appears to be licensed 
by Leibniz’ Law: If fact F1 is known to Smith, and F1 = F2, then surely F2 is 
known to Smith.  But there are clear counterexamples to it:  The fact of water 
splashing just is the moving of lots of H2O molecules, but someone can know 
that water is splashing without knowing anything about H2O; the fact of my 
being overpaid just is the fact of WGL’s being overpaid, but someone (who 
does not know that I am WGL) can know that WGL is overpaid while having 
no idea whether I am overpaid.
What has gone wrong?  As always and notoriously, Leibniz’ Law fails for 
representation-dependent properties.  That Oedipus wanted to marry Jocasta 
but did not want to marry his mother does not show that Jocasta was not his 
mother; the poor woman was his marriage-object under one description or 
mode of presentation but not under the other.8   And being known to Smith is a 
representation-dependent property: Whether Smith knows a given fact depends 
on how Smith represents that fact.  She may know it under one representation 
but not know it under a different one.  That is just what is going on in the 
“water” and “overpaid” examples.  One may see water splashing but lack the 
chemical perspective entirely; less commonly, a mad chemist might record a 
motion of H2O molecules but be mentally so far removed from the perspective 
of everyday things and substances that she has no thought of water.  
The “overpaid” example is perspectival too, but a different kind of perspec-
tive is at work.  Someone can know that WGL is overpaid without knowing 
that I am overpaid, if that person has only a public, (non-auto-)biographical 
perspective on me and is not in a position to refer to me more directly.  Even 
if the person were to come into the room, point straight at me and exclaim 
“You are overpaid,” I might insist that the knowledge she thereby expresses is 
still not quite the same knowledge I have when I know that I myself am over-
paid.  (Especially if I believe that she is mistaken as to who I am.)  As Hector 
Castañeda (1966) emphasized so many years ago,9  if I myself am amnesic I may 
know many facts about WGL, including that he is overpaid, without knowing 
that I myself am overpaid; so it seems that what I know when I do know that 
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I myself am overpaid is a different fact from any of those I could know while 
amnesic, and an intrinsically perspectival fact.  In order to designate the per-
son it is supposed to designate, a mental pronoun can be tokened only from a 
certain point of view; only I, WGL, can think “I” and thereby designate WGL.
Clearly, being known to Mary is a representation-dependent property; whether 
Mary knows a given fact depends on how she represents that fact.  Facts can 
be differently represented from differing perspectives, and that is why (4) is 
false.  Without (4), the Knowledge Argument collapses.
Now, sometimes philosophers do individuate “facts” in a less chunky, more 
fine-grained sort of way.  The late Roderick Chisholm (1976) used a version 
of principle (4) itself as a test for sameness of “fact.”10   In his sense, the water 
splashing is a different fact from the H2O molecules’ moving, odd as it sounds 
to say that.  
I do not think anyone could credibly insist that one of these two ways of 
counting “facts”—the chunky or the Chisholmian—is correct to the exclusion 
of the other.  I offer the following terminological proposal.  Let us continue to 
use the term “fact” in the more usual chunky way, with which we began, and 
let us call Chisholm-facts “pieces of information.”  The latter seems reasonable 
because Chisholm thinks of the things epistemically, as objects of conceptual 
knowledge rather than as chunks of the world.  Thus, the fact of water splash-
ing just is the moving of lots of H2O molecules, but  that water is splashing 
and that H2O molecules are moving are two different pieces of information. 
Likewise, according to the materialist, that such-and-such neural goings-on 
are taking place in a subject’s brain and that it is like so-and-so for the subject 
to have an experience are the same fact but different pieces of information.
Once this distinction is introduced, my objection to the Knowledge Ar-
gument may seem to have been blunted, for (by definition) (4) remains true 
at least of “facts” in the fine-grained sense, i.e., of pieces of information.  Has 
Jackson not then proven that there is information that is not public, objective, 
scientific etc. information?  
I say he has: Just plug in “piece of information” for “fact” in our official 
statement of Jackson’s argument, and I believe (pace those philosophers who 
simply deny (2) and those who resist the inference from (2) to (3)), that the 
resulting argument succeeds.  
The existence of nonphysical, subjective, intrinsically perspectival etc. 
information may or may not be of metaphysical interest.  But for purposes of 
philosophy of mind, here are two key ways in which it is not interesting:  (i) The 
phenomenon is not specifically about the mind; it is everywhere.  No amount 
of chemistry contains the information that water is splashing.  No amount of 
economic etc. information contains the information that I am overpaid.  And 
so forth.  And/but (ii) it does not follow in any of these cases that the object or 
stuff in question – water, or WGL – has a nonphysical or immaterial property. 
I believe Jackson tacitly makes this inference, from nonphysical (piece of) 
information to nonphysical property, and so commits a fallacy; otherwise, he 
has no argument for the existence of epiphenomenal qualia.
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So: I believe that there is special phenomenal knowledge.  Mary learns 
a new fact, the fact of what it is (actually) like to see red.  On my view, the 
sense in which this is a new fact is that fine-grained sense according to which 
“facts” are pieces of information that incorporate modes of presentation, or 
concepts under which the relevant chunks of spacetime are represented: thus, 
in this sense, that water is splashing and that H2O molecules are moving in 
such-and-such a way are different “facts,” though in a more obvious coarse-
grained sense they are one and the same fact.  In the fine-grained sense, that 
I weigh 200 pounds and that WGL does are different facts; that the meeting 
begins at noon and that it begins five minutes from now are different facts; 
etc.  In none of these cases is there any threat to the materialist view of hu-
man beings, but only different perspectives on the same chunk of spacetime. 
So too, when Mary learns that it is like… this [however she might classify the 
experience to herself] to see red, she is representing the qualitative character 
of the experience from the introspective perspective using an introspective 
concept, thereby generating a new finely-individuated fact, even though the 
spacetime chunk she is representing from that highly distinctive point of view 
is itself scientifically and naturalistically unremarkable.
9.  The ineffability of “what it’s like”:  This problem too succumbs to the perspec-
tivalist account I have been sketching.  When Mary represents the qualitative 
character of the experience of red, or yellowy-orange, from the introspective 
perspective she mobilizes an introspective concept, one that is proprietary to 
her introspector and (for a reason I cannot go into here) does not translate 
into English or any other natural language.  Of course, the coarse-grained fact 
that is being reported by her introspector can be expressed and described in 
many ways, corresponding to many different fine-grained “facts”; it is only 
the fine-grained piece of information incorporating the special introspective 
concept that has no natural-language translation.
10.  The “explanatory gap”:  I agree that the Gap is real.  But this is for 
two reasons, neither of which embarrasses materialism.  First, as I have said, 
phenomenal information and facts of “what it’s like” are ineffable.  But one 
cannot explain what one cannot express in the first place.  (The existence of 
ineffable facts is no embarrassment to science or to materialism, so long as they 
are fine-grained “facts,” incorporating modes of presentation.  It is the modes 
that make them ineffable, not the underlying coarse-grained fact.)  Second, 
the Gap is not confined to consciousness in any sense or even to mind; there 
are many kinds of intrinsically perspectival (fine-grained) facts that cannot be 
explained.  Pronominal modes of presentation again serve as a good example. 
Suppose an opthalmologist explains why WGL is nearsighted.  That does 
nothing to explain why I am nearsighted; nor could anyone or anything ex-
plain that—unless, of course, one first conceded the identity of me with WGL. 
11.  Of course I do not expect anyone (yet) to be convinced of my solu-
44   William G. Lycan
13
Lycan: The Plurality of Consciousness
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2002
6 x 9
tions to the six problems of phenomenal experience, when all I have offered 
are cryptic summaries of them and without a hint of argument.  (I do hope 
you will be moved to go out and buy my books, preferably in hardcover.)  But 
my solutions are solutions, in the sense that if correct they would solve the 
respective problems.  I believe each one is correct.  I may be wrong in one 
or more cases or even in all.  But remember that the most difficult problems 
of phenomenal experience are expressed as “how possibly” questions (“How 
could a purely physical organism be directly acquainted with qualia?”; “How 
could materialism permit the existence of intrinsically perspectival, ineffable 
facts?”).  A “here’s how possibly” answer must be treated with respect unless 
and until it is refuted.  
Of course, the solutions must be mutually consistent, as (so far as I can see) 
mine are.  But I hope I have gone some way toward persuading you that each of 
the problems becomes more tractable once it has been carefully distinguished 
from the others.
University of North Carolina
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FOOTNOTES
 1 This paper was originally entitled “Cognitive Theories of Consciousness.”  Thanks 
to Martin Davies and to Manuel Liz for their excellent comments on  it at 
the ICCS 99 conference, Donostia, Spain, May, 1999. 
 2  This theme has also been emphasized, and well documented, by Block (1995)  
and by Chalmers (1996).
  Baars (1995) rejoins against Block that “[w]hether consciousness is a ‘mongrel 
problem’ or purebred is an empirical question” (p. 249).  He gives the example 
of cancer, which for a time was considered a false natural kind but,  he says, is 
now again regarded as “the same underlying dysfunction, expressed by different 
pathways and in different tissues” (p. 249).  True or not, this squarely misses 
the point:  Different senses of “consciousness” may be found empirically to have 
the same referent, but that would be—just that—an empirical discovery, not 
something to be simply assumed or even to be established by a priori argument. 
 3  For a wonderful discussion of the temporal anomalies, see Chs. 5 and 6 of Den-
nett (1991).
 
 4  See also Block (1993) and Goldman (1993).
 5   Lycan (1987), (1996).  I will not rehearse any of the arguments for the positions, 
but you may take my word for it that they are decisive.  
 6  The metaphysics of nonexistence is of course another matter.  Another reason 
that the Representational theory may seem weird is that one cannot go into 
the metaphysics of nonexistence without getting weird.  But that is everyone’s 
problem, not the Representational theory’s in particular.  For our purposes here, 
just remind yourself that of course, in some sense, there are things that do not 
exist, and plug in your own favorite account of the nonactual.  (My own view 
of the nonactual is defended in Lycan (1994).)
 7  A surprising but harmless consequence of this view is that qualia are not them-
selves properties of the experiences that present them:  Qualia are represented 
properties of represented objects, and so they are only intentionally present in 
experiences.  As before, the relevant properties of the experiences are, repre-
senting this quality or that.
 8  I here ignore two complications: that some theorists insist that a “representa-
tion-dependent property” is no genuine property at all, and that Leibniz’ Law 
does hold for properties incorporating representations when the representations 
are de re.
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 9  Following Geach (1957); see also Perry (1979).
 10  Chisholm himself preferred to speak of states of affairs; for him, a fact is a state 
of affairs that (actually) obtains.
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